Confidentiality constraints often preclude the release of disaggregate data about individuals, which limits the types and accuracy of the results of geographical health analyses that could be done. Access to individually geocoded (disaggregate) data often involves lengthy and cumbersome procedures through review boards and committees for approval (and sometimes is not possible). Moreover, current data confidentiality-preserving solutions compatible with fine-level spatial analyses either lack flexibility or yield less than optimal results (because of confidentiality-preserving changes they introduce to disaggregate data), or both. In this paper, we present a simulation case study to illustrate how some analyses cannot be (or will suffer if) done on aggregate data. We then quickly review some existing data confidentiality-preserving techniques, and move on to explore a solution based on software agents with the potential of providing flexible, controlled (software-only) access to unmodified confidential disaggregate data and returning only results that do not expose any person-identifiable details. The solution is thus appropriate for micro-scale geographical analyses where no person-identifiable details are required in the final results (i.e., only aggregate results are needed). Our proposed software agent technique also enables post-coordinated analyses to be designed and carried out on the confidential database(s), as needed, compared to a more conventional solution based on the Web Services model that would only support a rigid, pre-coordinated (pre-determined) and rather limited set of analyses. The paper also provides an exploratory discussion of mobility, security, and trust issues associated with software agents, as well as possible directions/solutions to address these issues, including the use of virtual organizations. Successful partnerships between stakeholder organizations, proper collaboration agreements, clear policies, and unambiguous interpretations of laws and regulations are also much needed to support and ensure the success of any technological solution.
Introduction: on the limitations of aggregated data in geographical analyses
Confidentiality constraints often preclude the release of disaggregate data about individuals, which limits the types and accuracy of the results of geographical health analyses that could be done [1] . Individual agencies holding micro-data (small population/individual health and environmental data) often impose restrictions on the level of geography that can be reported. In the US, for example, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS-http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/) requires that for all micro-data that are released outside of NCHS, geographic identification must be deleted for all areas below the State level, which contain fewer than some predetermined number of inhabitants. Traditional ecological analysis based on choropleth mapping and the analysis of aggregate data for administrative areas has been heavily criticized. It is increasingly becoming clear in the field of public health that individual-level health information aggregated to pre-existing political or other administrative areas to protect individual privacy often destroys information needed for geographical analyses making it impossible to address many important public health concerns, e.g., accident risk of particular environments, hazards of living close to hazardous waste sites, exposure risk from lead associated with urban highways, etc. Such concerns can only be addressed using microdata. The lack of spatially-disaggregate data on healthcare utilization and clinical activity also limits the types and power of healthcare delivery studies that can be carried out [2] [3] [4] [5] .
Using aggregated data instead of address-level data (when the latter is required) produces what Jacquez [6] calls ''spatial uncertainty.'' Moreover, using area centroids instead of exact locations can yield misleading results [6] . According to Armstrong et al. [5] , when data are spatially aggregated to large areas, the ability of researchers to detect disease clusters or to investigate suspected relationships between environmental exposures and disease events is affected in four ways:
(1) Absolute and relative locations within the geographical extent of each area are unobservable making it impossible to perform tests of clustering, except for those designed to operate specifically on data aggregated to areas; (2) The effect of the geographic scale of the aggregation with respect to the geographic scale of the clusters means that the aggregation level used in an analysis limits the size of clusters that could be detected; (3) The shape and placement of aggregation areas in relation to the real-world distribution of the disease or clusters under study, e.g., when a disease cluster straddles two or more aggregation areas, may result in ambiguous or negative results; and (4) Accurate analyses are only possible when health data are spatially encoded to the boundaries of areas with common levels of environmental exposure, which is usually not the case since exposure assessment data are generally collected for different areas than health and demographic data.
The next section presents a simulation model to illustrate how some public health analyses cannot be (or will greatly suffer if) done on aggregate data, and to provide some justification for the necessity of new data confidentiality-preserving approaches like the software agents solution that we are proposing later in this paper.
2. The problem of identifying areas of high disease risk from privacy protected geocodes on cases of disease: a simulation case study As mentioned above, limiting the accuracy of geocodes for the purposes of privacy protection degrades the ability to identify areas of high disease risk. Evidence is provided in Figs. 1 and 2 , which, although based on simulated disease cases, illustrate the degrading effect of substituting for individually identifiable disease cases and spatially disaggregated population data-Figs. 1B and C, spatially aggregated disease and population data-Figs. 2B and C. A hypothetical spatial pattern of relative risk surrounding a hypothetical, high-disease risk rural location is shown in Fig. 1A .
Disease risk decreases exponentially with increasing distance from a given location and reaches a base rate of one at a given distance from the site of maximum risk:
where RR i is the relative risk at location i; RR max is the relative risk at the site of greatest relative risk; p is a scale factor that affects the decline rate of relative risk with distance; x i is the distance between location i and the location of maximum risk; D lag is the distance from the site of greatest risk at which the relative risk is one.
The individual cases (Fig. 1B) constitute 2000 cases drawn at random from the product of population and relative risk as computed from the equation above and illustrated in the hypothetical relative risk surface shown in Fig. 1A for which RR max = 5 and D lag = 10 miles. An estimated relative risk surface is produced (Fig. 1D) by placing a one-mile grid on the two data layers of Figs. 1B and C and, at each grid intersection, estimating the relative risk as the density of cases to population relative to a region-wide rate in fivemile radius kernels. Note the close resemblance between the spatial pattern of risk in Fig. 1D and the hypothetical pattern of Fig. 1A from which the 2000 simulated cases in Fig. 1B were produced. In contrast, in Fig. 2B the same simulated cases have been aggregated into census tracts-a common procedure used by many cancer registries in the United States to protect patient privacy when releasing cancer incidence case totals. Similarly, the same population data as in Fig. 1C are shown in Fig. 2C as aggregated totals for census tracts. An estimated relative risk surface (Fig. 2D) is produced from the overlay of the data layers in Figs. 2B and C using the same method that produced Fig. 1D . Note in this case, however, that, unlike the close resemblance of Fig. 1D with Fig. 1A , the pattern in Fig. 2D does not have a close resemblance with Fig. 1A . The inability to produce the correct spatial pattern of risk in Fig. 2D is a consequence of the spatial aggregation of the two data sources. This case study illustrates a common problem caused by using spatially aggregated disease case data to protect the privacy of individuals.
The scenario of this case study is realistic in the sense that it uses real population data. Fig. 2C shows US Census 2000 population counts for census tracts in four eastern Iowa counties (Benton, Linn, Iowa, and Johnson), total population 342,864. The population data in Fig. 1C are based on the US Census population totals for census blocks in the four county area disaggregated to a level of approximately 90 m 2 areas by the Geographic Information Science and Technology group at Oak Ridge National Laboratory using intelligent spatial interpolation methods (for details see Report # 2 at http://www.uiowa.edu/~gishlth/ UIORNL/).
Current data confidentiality-preserving solutions
Traditional privacy preserving techniques like pseudonymization, which might be appropriate in genomic medicine research [7] , for example, are not suitable for use in micro-scale geographical analyses. The reason pseudonymization is not suitable for disaggregate spatial analyses is that it changes a crucial piece of person-identifiable details required for such analyses: the individualÕs point address/Zip Code or postcode. For spatial studies, many solutions have been devised in an attempt to preserve data confidentiality while still enabling various degrees of fine-level analyses and acceptable results.
These solutions involve:
(1) The use of statistical and epidemiological methods to mask the geographic location of data in a way that can still permit meaningful analysis, e.g., special types of spatial and temporal aggregation of data; and (2) The creation of secure (networked) environments with limited and multiple levels of access (to confidential data) in which public health researchers can be carefully monitored to ensure protection of individual and household confidentiality.
These solutions are discussed below. They either lack flexibility or yield less than optimal results (because of confidentiality-preserving changes they introduce to disaggregate data), or both.
Statistical and epidemiological methods
Armstrong et al. [5] describe different promising types of geographical masks to encode the geography of health records. These masks not only preserve the confidentiality of individual health records, but also preserve, to the maximum degree possible, the geographic properties of the data, thus permitting the investigation of questions that can be validly answered only with some (adequate) knowledge about the location of health events.
The geographic coordinates of data collected at discrete locations can be subjected to a family of affine point transformations that move these locations deterministically to a new set of locations. Another technique is random perturbation, in which each point is displaced (within the range of a constant maximum magnitude of displacement) by a randomly determined amount, and in a randomly determined direction, specific to its original location. A third class of geographic masks is aggregation. Areal aggregation involves enumerating the total that exists within a region. Point aggregation uses a single, surrogate location to represent the location of several individual-level events. In the latter case, regions could be represented by their geographic centroids, or surrogate locations could be computed that are optimized regarding some defined relationship to the original locations (location-allocation methods). Other point aggregation methods include microaggregation and blurring. It is also possible to aggregate for nonconterminous ''regions'' of interest like releasing health data for all areas within a given distance of a specified hazard, e.g., all childrenÕs accidents within 20 m of stop signs. Another possible approach to limiting disclosure is to remove all explicit geographic identifiers from the health record and replace them with contextual information of specific interest to the data user [5] .
The best approach will depend on the purpose of the data user as well as the degree of disclosure risk that the data custodian wishes to tolerate. Preliminary research suggests that random perturbation of data, up to some limit, is superior to affine and aggregation masks for many analytical purposes [5] .
Areal aggregation is perhaps the most commonly adopted approach among those suggested by Armstrong et al. [5] . Health organizations are always looking for finer levels of boundary geography to aggregate their data to. For example, in the US, organizations might aggregate their data at census tract level instead of county level. (A US census tract is a small statistical subdivision of a county designed to be relatively homogenous with respect to demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and living conditions, and to contain between 1500 and 8000 residents.)
Secure networks with multiple access levels
Croner [8] describes a solution to data confidentiality problems consisting of multiple levels of access to data classified according to sensitivity, ranging from confidential/protected data to public/open access data according to user credentials. Access to confidential data can be accommodated for qualified users in secure Intranet or Internet settings.
The US NCI GIS for Health (National Cancer Institute Geographic Information System for Health-GIS-H) developed as part of the Long Island Breast Cancer Study Project (LIBCSP) provides a good example of a successful implementation of multiple levels of data access according to user credentials. A ''Researchers'' area of the LIBCSP Web site provides applications necessary for access and use of non-public resources that are subject to privacy and licensing restrictions (http:// www.healthgis-li.com/researchers/researchers.htm). On the other hand, data, information, maps and software that have been approved for public dissemination are available to anyone.
Similarly, the Washington State Health DepartmentÕs online Epidemiologic Query and Mapping System (EpiQMS-http://epiqms.doh.wa.gov/) incorporates three levels of security to accommodate citizens, public health and medical practitioners, and public health agency investigators access to state and regional health data. This security model allows different levels of access to the data depending on the likelihood that an individualÕs privacy could be compromised [8] .
Also noteworthy is NCHSÕ in-house Research Data Center [9] . This is a secure physical environment where external researchers can (physically) work with more detailed data sets, but not remove the data sets from the NCHS repository. The solution works but is very cumbersome and lacks flexibility (e.g., requires researchers to travel to the data center).
A software agent-based data confidentiality-preserving solution for micro-data geographical analyses
It is useful to think of two broad categories of spatial analyses that might be carried out:
(1) Analyses within an original data repository (repository with person-identifiable data), e.g., a cancer registry where analysis might be done using the latitude-longitude coordinate for the residential address of the cancer patient; and (2) Analyses using public domain data. Such data would first need to be aggregated before making them accessible to researchers.
Over the past several years, completion of protocols for projects involving research on original data repositories (like cancer registry data) for Human Subject Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and research ethics committees has been difficult and time-consuming [10] .
As a result, researchers have been thinking more about designing software that could be sent to the original data repository, so the analysis could be done inside the original data repository and then a summary aggregate report sent back to the researcher, rather than trying to obtain IRB approvals so that the data custodian can send data to the investigator, or develop studies where data with identifiers would need to be sent by the data repository to the researcher.
Back in 1999, Armstrong et al. [5] mentioned one such solution based on software agents. If an agent were designed to support the analysis of public health data, users would not be required to have access to confidential health records. Rather, they would submit a request to an intelligent analysis agent that would assess the request, and if found appropriate, would complete the analysis and return a result to the data user without exposing any individual-level health data.
It is noteworthy that the Health System Resident Component (HSRC), part of RODS, the Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance system (http:// www.health.pitt.edu/rods/), is based on ''similar'' concepts. HSRC is located within the firewall of a health system (e.g., a participating hospital), and its purpose is to provide RODS with additional public health surveillance functions that would not be possible if it were located outside of the firewall due to restrictions on the release of identifiable clinical data. It functions as a case detector in a distributed public health surveillance scheme linking laboratory and radiology data to increase the specificity of case detection. HSRC removes identifiable information before transmitting any data to RODS servers (outside the health systemÕs firewall) [11] .
In addition to better protection of privacy, conducting the analysis in the original data repository provides the ability to aggregate and disaggregate data, and to explore whether spatial relationships are persistent at different spatial scales.
On software agents
The concept of software agents can be traced back to artificial intelligence and discrete event simulation research in the early-mid 1980s and has now grown into a major research topic drawing in addition on sources in economics, game theory, and social science. Although a range of attributes are variously ascribed to agents [12] , there is consensus that in essence an agent is (Fig. 3) .
reactive: it responds to changes in its environment; pro-active: it generates and attempts to achieve goals; social: it has the capacity to interact with other agents and even to cooperate.
In software engineering terms, agents are proposed as the next level of abstraction up from objects [13] , and indeed it is much more straightforward to translate software requirements into agent behaviors than it is to object methods, but it is still yet early days for the technology. Perhaps more important is the principle that a software agent be able to cope with a changing environment-typically one that the designer did not foresee. Consequently high-level declarative programming techniques are often adopted that describe what is to be achieved but not how to achieve it. Examples of these approaches are logic programming-for example, using Prolog-or choosing what action to take based on how much closer it takes the agent to satisfying some condition-an adaptation of the idea of utility maximization from economics. In this way, choosing what to do-action selection-is delegated to the software and the choice is made at the time when all the data are available, rather than being fixed by a programmer days, weeks or even years previously, when (s)he can only guess at the environment in which the software will be operating. This underlines a further key aspect, that of autonomy: a software agent normally only does what it is asked to do if it fits with its goals and its agenda. Agent attributes that are present in some systems but not all are mobility, veracity, benevolence, rationality, and adaptability (typically through learning). This might all sound rather alarming when, for safety-critical scenarios, there is a tendency to want more control over software actions, not less, but this should be weighed against the potential advantages, as outlined above, arising from a software agent being in a position to choose an action appropriate to the circumstance rather than the programmer choosing something inappropriate in ignorance of the circumstance.
Software agents carry with them their own new security risks, which must be properly addressed. Mechanisms need to be introduced, for example, to digitally sign, authenticate and authorize genuine agents and their transactions, and prevent ''Trojan horse'' like attacks by fake or rogue agents [14] .
Clearly, software agents are potentially very complex and, at first sight, harder to validate against safety and security requirements. But their very high-level nature (in which requirements are closely related to agent behaviors, and behavior can be evaluated against institutional norms) actually offers the opportunity to simplify matters: we will return to these issues in the next section.
Mobility, security, trust issues, and solutions
Mobile programs are technically very challenging to realize, although the development of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM [15] ), the principle of write-once runanywhere, the widespread deployment of Java platforms (via browsers), the development of suitable toolkits [16, 17] and most important of all, the sophistication of the Java security model [18, 19] have all considerably eased the situation. There are two categories of mobile scenario: (i) where the software is on a mobile device, such as a laptop or PDA and (ii) where the software actually suspends execution on one machine and is transferred across a network and starts execution again on a second machine. Each offers their own security challenges and potential exploits (see discussion below), so much so that, because of the inadequacy of currently implemented security models, it is in general better to replace mobility by communication, where possible.
However, the scenario under consideration here specifies that the data resources contain personal identification information that may not be exported from the security domain. If we look at this problem from the viewpoint of the physical world, it is like permitting a person to enter a reading room, process some of the records held there, and exit with the results as long as they contain only aggregated data (cf. NCHS Research Data Center [9] ). Naturally, the person may not enter into any communication with outside parties while in the reading room (no mobile phones!). Analogously, a mobile agent solution sees the creation of an agent at Organization 1, loading it with a description of the task to be completed, transferring it to Organization 2, where the data are located, letting it compute the results and leaving. Unfortunately, this is a case in which the virtual world of software and networks is more subtle and difficult to police than the physical world: security checks are in general much harder to enforce and breaches less easy to detect.
Let us summarize the problems of admitting external code to a site to be secured, such as Organization 2 in the scenario above:
(1) The external code is vulnerable to interference by the host: how can the integrity of the external code be guaranteed? (2) The host is vulnerable to interference by the external code: how can the behavior of the external code be constrained without hopelessly compromising usability? (3) Authentication procedures offer only limited security: as with any cryptography, it is only as secure as the next advance in code-breaking. (4) Authorization procedures are in general poorly understood and implementation is even worse: the Java security model incorporating stack inspection (Java 2.4) is pretty much state of the art. (5) Firewalls can isolate the external code, but this may prevent legitimate and even necessary communication: how can (almost certainly encrypted) communications be checked for breaches of security? (6) The operations on the secure data and the aggregate results may either or both constitute intellectual property of the organization owning the agent and so may not be revealed to the organization hosting the data: how can it be ensured that the results do not identify any individuals?
We propose that the solution to all these problems is the application of virtual institutions. Since this concept is relatively new, we offer a few key references and a brief synopsis. In fact, overlapping areas of concern are evoked by three terms used for research in this area: virtual institutions [20, 21] , virtual organizations (VOs) [22] and coalition formation [23] . 1 Then cutting across there are emergent institutions that derive from social interactions and the evolution of social norms, in contrast to legal institutions, that may formalize social institutions-like marriage-or may be created by a legislature as a means to governance-like drug approval processes. We do not intend to be contentious, but in the cause of brevity, we warn the reader that it is more than likely that our description of these terms and their relationships would not satisfy all researchers into these issues. Virtual institution research largely focuses on either the emergence or the specification (and verification) of norm-based systems-where a norm 2 may capture participantsÕ required behavior with varying degrees of precision, from the abstract, through rules to the level of protocols. As such, institutions may be defined independent of the actors that participate in them-thus they can be viewed as classes-and then instantiated-like objects-to meet a particular need; see for example [24] . At the other end of the spectrum, coalitions are normally the product of the participantsÕ negotiation over how to cooperate to satisfy common goals that are individually unachievable. In between there are virtual organizations that are informed partially by both the other two, in that the entities may not be individual actors, but parts of organizations and thus bound by organizational (institutional) constraints.
The situation presented in this paper sits within the framework of the legal institution, since actions are constrained by legal requirements, both from the government and the national health agency, as well as from the organization in which the individual works who is carrying out the analysis. Let us now focus on the problem and the scenarios depicted in Fig. 4 . Scenario 1. Agent 1 transfers to Organization A, computes its results and leaves. Satisfactory, apart from the caveats above; in particular, agent 1 possibly has access to all the data in store 1, not just the data it needs. Scenario 2. Agent 2 wants to combine information held in Organization A and Organization B, so it transfers to A, computes (aggregate) results, transfers to B and computes its final results. The constraint here is that because only aggregate data can be exported, it is difficult to carry out meaningful analyses using multiple data sources. Scenario 3. Agent 3 wants to do the same as Agent 2 but without the aggregation constraint, so it requests the creation of a virtual organization whose data store provides access only to the data needed from each source, transfers to it, computes its results and leaves. The virtual organization is destroyed-although a record of its creation and parameters should be preserved in the provenance information of the computed results (for future reconstruction and reproduction of results).
The immediate concern with scenario 3 is that data appear to be exported from both Organizations A and B. It is here that the properties of the virtual world help us, rather than the opposite, because although it is sometimes desirable, it is not necessary for logical security domains to coincide with physical boundaries. Consider, for example, an employee working from home via a virtual enterprise network (VEP): this is an extrusion of the organizationÕs security domain to include the employeeÕs home PC. In a similar way, a virtual organization can be synthesized to combine access to specified resources in each constituent organization-some of which might themselves be virtual organizations-thus each data source remains within the security domain of its respective host organization.
The benefits of using a virtual organization are that (i) the host organization is insulated against the incoming agent and (ii) leakage is minimized by limiting access to the necessary data, thus addressing problems 2 and 4 above. Use of a VO also improves the situation with respect to problem 6, since the regulations governing the VO may be published and verified, so demonstrating that information brought into the VO or created in the VO remains the property of the agent (or its owner). Finally, a VO permits the assembly of disaggregated data from a range of sources, but in a secure environment that maintains the security policy of the owning 1 For current activity in any of these areas, see also any of the proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), ACM Press. 2 Our use of the term norm has much in common with economics and with legal theory and refers to the relatively unfamiliar definition as ''a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior''. organization for each resource. This is simply not possible in the peripatetic mobile agent setting.
This leaves outstanding the problems of agent vulnerability (problem 1), which is to a certain extent also addressed by the publication and verification of the VO regulations, authentication (problem 3), which is just a case of using the latest off-the-shelf technology, and secure communications that do not break identification policy (problem 5). Both 1 and 5 can be resolved by the use of proxies, that is, instead of the agent transferring itself into the virtual organization, a representative or proxy agent is created on its behalf to carry out actions within the VO. Consequently, the agent is not vulnerable to the environment of the VO, while the proxy, whose range of actions are constrained by the VOÕs regulations, can only do what the VO permits it, for example, in terms of what data may be communicated to the agent. Meanwhile the agent, being outside the VO is free to communicate as it will.
Thus far, we have presented technical solutions to technical problems (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . Problem 6 is a mixture of the technical and the social in that for multi-agent systems to be deployed there must be sufficient trust in their observing the privacy norms that are required. Trust in computational systems is a delicate issue and has been the subject of research, especially within the emergent institution community, for a number of years. However, there are many aspects to trust which can all too easily be conflated and hence confused. Again, we do not want to be contentious, but inevitably a brief outline will miss the nuances of a fuller treatment. Broadly, trust, in the scenario under discussion here, might be seen from two perspectives: (i) the external observer who wishes to be assured that privacy legislation-and the more detailed operational guarantees that represent the implementation of that legislation-shall be adhered to 3 and (ii) inter-agent trust, where research is focusing on modeling reputation [25] and social networks [26] . In case (i) trust is a function of the correctness of the institution and techniques are starting to appear to capture and to verify adherence to norms (rules and protocols), while still retaining the flexibility of multi-agent systems [27] [28] [29] . At the present time, case (ii) is not so directly relevant to our scenario, but may yet become so.
Has the privacy problem for micro analyses actually been ''solved'' or has it just been pushed into a different place? Who or what will be responsible for the creation of the virtual organization? Here are some arguments and answers (with reference to the two organization scenario):
• The VO will be defined and verified by each of the physical organizations to ensure that it implements their security policy-or none will be created if the policies are irreconcilable.
• The future for (semantic) Web services, agents and organizations that we envision has machine-readable descriptions of organizations expressed in an appropriate logical formalism that programs can reason about and manipulate, so that the creation of the VO and its validation can be at least semi-automatic, if not fully.
• Thus, existing physical organizations will, in the first case be responsible for codifying their policies and getting them validated and possibly certified by external agencies.
• However, the VO will be the product of the physical organizationsÕ requirements and in that way they will retain control and responsibility for what takes place.
In conclusion, the reader will see that we have come full circle back to a communication-based solution, but it was only the exploration of the requirements, stated in mobile agent terms, and the security issues that transpired, that stimulated the identification of the concepts put forward. Although the solution outlined does not involve the use of mobile agents, indeed it has sought to avoid them, there is still potential for a solution using mobile agents. At the present time however, the primary obstacle is that no language run-time currently available implements the necessary security mechanism (Java and .NET included). A detailed analysis of these issues, and a scenario like that discussed here, can be found in [30] .
Software agents vs. web services
Our proposed software agent technique ensures maximum flexibility in that it enables post-coordinated analyses to be designed and carried on the confidential database(s), as needed. By comparison, an alternative solution based on the Web Services model [31] (and standard secured network communication), though potentially much easier to ensure its security, would be less flexible. In such an alternative solution, the data analysis component (Web Service) would reside permanently on the network/server where the confidential data are stored. It would receive, authenticate, and validate external requests, which must use the componentÕs scripting language to describe the required analyses. If an analysis cannot be described using the componentÕs scripting language then it cannot be executed (less flexible, pre-coordinated solution). Moreover, though Web Services can be nested, problems again might occur when an analysis involves confidential data from two different servers/networks. The development, publication and strict enforcement of appropriate, unambiguous policies, laws and regulations will continue to be important in regulating health and healthcare research involving person-identifiable data [8, 32] . Technological solutions, including our proposed software agents techniques, will not completely solve all legal complexities surrounding the non-treatment use of person-identifiable data and individual data confidentiality [10, 33, 34] (they might even introduce with them new legal concerns). These legal aspects should be re-examined and clarified whenever any new solution is introduced.
Establishing and maintaining successful partnerships between relevant stakeholder organizations, and having proper (written) collaboration agreements and clear data sharing/research policies [34] are two other crucial ingredients that must be present to enable smooth agent transactions between the different organizations sharing data and agents. Such partnerships and agreements are essential in establishing an environment of trust where these agents, their owners and data custodians can work and collaborate securely and productively.
Conclusions
Confidentiality constraints often preclude the release of disaggregate data about individuals, which limits the types and accuracy of the results of geographical health analyses that could be done. We presented a simulation case study to show how by limiting the accuracy of geocodes for the purposes of privacy protection, the ability to identify areas of high disease risk is degraded. The simulation hypothesized a relationship between a highdisease risk source and a population health effect. A test was done for association with individually geocoded data and an equivalent test for aggregated geocoded data (from the same simulated data). The high-disease risk source-effect association was found with the individually coded but not with the aggregated data.
Access to individually geocoded (disaggregate) data often involves lengthy and cumbersome procedures through review boards and committees for approval (and sometimes is not possible). Moreover, current data confidentiality-preserving solutions compatible with fine-level spatial analyses either lack flexibility or yield less than optimal results (because of confidentiality-preserving changes they introduce to disaggregate data), or both. This is where our proposed software agents solution can come in to help, providing flexible, controlled (software-only) access to unmodified confidential disaggregate data, and returning only results that do not expose any person-identifiable details.
Software agents, including their mobile variety, can act on behalf of an investigator or group of researchers who have a legitimate data mining/analysis request, moving as required between networks and servers where confidential data are stored, or creating secure virtual organizations where confidential data can be pooled from multiple sources, performing the required data mining and analysis functions on the spot, and returning only useful aggregate results and conclusions without any individual-identifiable details to the researcher or group they are representing.
Our proposed software agent technique also enables post-coordinated analyses to be designed and carried out on the confidential database(s), as needed, compared to a more conventional solution based on the Web Services model that would only support a fixed, pre-coordinated (pre-determined) and rather limited set of analyses.
However, the use of software agents in this kind of applications is not as simple as it might sound, and also carries with it its own new security risks, which must be properly addressed. Mechanisms need to be introduced, for example, to digitally sign and authenticate genuine agents and their transactions, and prevent ''Trojan horse'' like attacks by fake or rogue agents. We have provided an exploratory discussion of mobility, security and trust issues associated with software agents, as well as possible directions/solutions to address these issues, including the use of virtual organizations.
Successful partnerships between stakeholder organizations, collaboration agreements, clear policies, and unambiguous interpretations (and, when necessary, revisions) of laws and regulations are also much needed to support and ensure the success of any technological solution.
